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aBstract
The article discusses creation and evolution of the official image of Soviet state power 
between 1917 and the 1930s. This image was deliberately constructed and included sym-
bols of statehood (national coat of arms; motto; flag; and anthem); institutions that em-
bodied characteristics of power organization; leaders as personification of power; the state 
myth; rituals; and sites of memory. Throughout the early Soviet period, the evolving im-
age of power reflected the changes in the government’s self-understanding. Regarding the 
structure and the ideological content of the image of power, we can point out three succes-
sive variations: revolutionary, people’s (workers and peasants), and Party-state. The article 
describes the structure of these variations and the factors that shaped their development. 
Key words: symbols of power, Soviet government, early Soviet society, image of So-
viet power
Displays of power are an important aspect of government strategies and 
practices, which determine the perception of the government both by the 
public and by the international community. Through the public image of 
power, the government conveys information about its mission, goals, and 
means of achieving them. As a result of the revolutions and civil wars, the 
Russian society was deeply divided, which led to the creation of a new state. 
One of the crucial tasks faced by the Soviet regime was to create a new image 
of power and to legitimize itself in the conditions of social turmoil. The So-
viet government not only sought to “conquer” the country and establish con-
trol over it, but to create a sustainable social base for further development. 
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The image of power was primarily formed through government prac-
tices, which had to be supported by the society. To gain people’s approval, 
the government used agitation and propaganda to convince the public of 
the necessity and practical value of the proposed measures. In case of open 
confrontation, the government resorted to force (coercion, intimidation, 
persecutions). As history shows, the persuasive power of fear serves as 
a good supplement to slogans and other means of agitation. In the long 
term, the government ensured people’s loyalty and support through such 
mechanism as upbringing – the system of rules and norms approved by the 
government which influence people’s minds and behaviour through state 
rituals and holidays, sites of memory, mass media, education, literature, 
art, and science. In Soviet practice, the function of upbringing was realized 
not only by the Party and state structures but also by public organiza-
tions, production structures, including the penal system (Gulag), which 
followed the formula of “correction through labour”. 
Thus, the image of Soviet power was deliberately constructed through 
various mechanisms and by employing various resources. Yet, we should 
not limit ourselves only to the reconstruction and analysis of official repre-
sentations of power. The image that was constructed and disseminated by 
the government was perceived by the public in a variety of ways, ranging 
from “positive” perceptions, which corresponded to the government’s in-
tention, to “critical” and “negative”, which reflected the protest moods in 
the society. Therefore, we should focus on the reconstruction and analysis 
of these types of public perception of power: how they were represented 
in the mass consciousness and how they affected collective reactions. 
This article aims to identify the key symbols and to reconstruct the official 
image of Soviet state power by tracing back its evolution in the early Soviet 
period (1917–1930s). 
The significant characteristic of this period is social experimentation: 
the Bolsheviks found themselves at the helm of the country ravaged by 
the war, still feverish after the Revolution, therefore, they had to tackle 
a range of problems, starting from formation of the new state, its protec-
tion and consolidation in the wake of the civil war to social transforma-
tions and building a Communist society. 
These two goals – protection of the “Socialist motherland” and building 
of Communism – shaped the long-term ideological agenda of the Soviet gov-
ernment, especially in the early Soviet period. These goals set the main trend 
in how power was displayed as the government not only needed to win over 
people’s loyalty but also gain their active support, which meant that people 
had to be willing to cooperate and even risk their lives for the new regime. 
Therefore, formation of the public image of power was accompanied by in-
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tensive social engineering, which was aimed at the creation of the New Per-
son – an “ardent activist” and “staunch communist”, in other words, a person 
who does not question the Party’s and government’s orders.
It should be noted that in constructing its public image, the Soviet gov-
ernment originally intended to reject the old political tradition (monarchy) 
and to position the new government bodies (Soviets) as the mouthpiece 
for the exploited classes. The idea of “people’s power”1 was then replaced 
by the idea of klassovost (class consciousness), which had a direct impact 
on the ways the new regime chose to represent its social base. 
Looking at how the image of Soviet power evolved, it is important to 
take into account the “political baggage” which the Bolsheviks had accu-
mulated by the time of the October coup. As representatives of the radical 
underground political culture, which sought to break away from the old 
order, the Bolsheviks started to implement these principles in their state 
policy when they came to power. Their policy was aimed at eliminating the 
opposition and, thus, achieving unity that would have excluded dissidence. 
The Bolsheviks lacked the skills of conducting political dialogue and 
experience of parliamentary government, they also rejected the liberal 
model of power as bourgeois heritage. Therefore, they laid the ideas of 
struggle and unity at the core of the image of Soviet power. Another key 
component of this image was the future which required all kinds of sacri-
fices and justified whatever decisions the government made (see Table 1). 
Thus, the message based on this complex of ideas (future, struggle, unity, 
and klassovost) was at the heart of the image of Soviet power and was con-
veyed through structural symbols and signs. 
strUctUre oF the iMage oF Power
The image of power is a semiotic system that comprises the government’s 
representation of itself and representations of power that emerge with-
in society. These include ideas about the nature of power, its functions 
and structure and people’s social and political expectations2. The image 
of power should be clear and easy to perceive and show the difference 
1 Here I am referring to the “theory of official nationality” proposed by S.S. Uvarov. 
For more detail, see: R. Vortman, Offitsialnaya narodnost’ i natsionalny mif rossiyskoy mon-
arkhii XIX veka, in: ROSSIA/RUSSIA, 3 (11): Kulturnye praktiki v ideologicheskoy perspective, 
Moskva 1999, pp. 233–244. 
2 N.A. Romanovich, Obraz vlasti kak otrazhenie rossiyskoy politicheskoy kultury, “Vestnik 
Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Seria: lingvistika i mezhkulturnaya kom-
munikatsia” 2010, 1, p. 169.
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between this regime and others, previous or alternative. Furthermore, the 
system of power has to include ideas and symbols reflecting the gener-
al attributes of power and symbolizing its might and strength, progress 
(crucial for the modernization period), stability, justice, and narodnost or 
national character (the government as the spokesman for the people and 
protector of their interests). 
The following elements constituted the image of power and deter-
mined its effectiveness as an instrument of influence: 
– symbols reflecting the state mission (coat of arms, motto, flag, anthem, 
and the signs of the star, sickle and hammer),
– state institutions embodying organizational and legal foundations of 
power (Soviets, Red Army, Bolshevik Party, and so on),
– social groups which the government relies on and which are consid-
ered as its adherents (working class, peasantry),
– personifications of power in a specific historical and territorial aspect 
(leaders), 
– state myth (Soviet myth),
– rituals (state ceremonies and holidays),
– sites of memory (monuments, memorials, museums, and documents 
such as a constitution, declaration, manifest, and banknotes).
Power is primarily displayed through state symbols. According to B.I. 
Kolonitsky, “symbols make an integral part of formation, formalization, 
and reproduction of identity of any political structure or group”3. Symbols 
not only legitimize the governing regime but also foster loyalty among its 
faithful supporters. They also play a compensatory role as they relieve 
social anxieties and tensions, shifting the focus of people’s attention from 
their current problems to more global aims. Yet one more function that 
should be mentioned is communication: symbols communicate the main 
ideas of the government to people and inscribe them on the subconscious 
level, thus, turning these symbols into channels of information. The na-
tional coat of arms represents the quintessence of national identity and 
statehood: all its elements, starting from the general design to the most 
minute details, are imbued with meaning (Fig. 1). 
The image must be complete: a lack of certain elements or inadequate 
combination of elements can affect its efficiency. Creation of a proper ima-
ge of power is a time-consuming process, which comprises such stages as 
designing, construction, and reconstruction. How much time and effort 
are invested in this process largely depends on the government’s position 
3 B.I. Kolonitsky, Simvoly vlasti i borba za vlast: k izucheniyu politicheskoy kultury rossi-
yskoy revolutsii 1917 g., St. Petersburg 2000. 
197iMages oF Power in the earLy soviet society...
(whether it upholds the continuity of tradition or rejects the heritage of 
the previous regimes); internal and external conditions (stable/unstable); 
availability of image production mechanisms and the government’s ma-
stery of these mechanisms as well as the government’s awareness of the 
importance of these tasks. 
The construction of the image of Soviet power comprised two distinct 
stages: the period of spontaneous construction (November 1917–March 
1918): the process of construction was chaotic, based on intuitive reasoning 
and on the Party’s underground experience of interaction with the masses. 
At this stage, the image of power was primarily constructed through the 
legislative practices of the new governmental bodies. One of the key roles 
was played by decrees, which signified the Bolsheviks’ determination to 
realize their promises made in the period of the October coup and to meet 
the expectations of the masses (peasants, workers, and soldiers). 
Starting from April 1918, when the main propaganda structures were cre-
ated, the process of image construction became more and more organized, 
focused, and directed by the government, which monopolized control 
over the mass media, education, literature, art, cinema, and other infor-
mation channels and used them for its own ends. 
Thus, the image of power operates with emotionally charged symbols, 
it is dynamic and can be transformed in response to the current agenda. 
At its core, however, the image of power is stable and provides historical, 
temporal and spatial identity of statehood. The efficiency of the constructed 
Fig. 1. National coat of arms of the RSFSR (19 July 1918–20 July 1920) 
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image of power can be estimated through its public perceptions: the more 
identical they are, the more efficient the image of power is, although 
in reality full unanimity is rarely found. Even in totalitarian societies in 
which conformity is enforced, there is an opposition seeking to present its 
own, alternative image of power. 
evoLUtion oF the iMage oF soviet Power 
In its evolution, the image of power is influenced by a number of fac-
tors, which can be divided into subjective and objective. Subjective factors 
are determined by internal and external conditions in which the regime 
operates. For example, war is a destabilizing factor, capable of destroying 
the attractive image of power. The same can be said about the results of 
foreign and domestic policy and the level of public trust. Subjective factors 
are directly related to historical figures that exercise authority. The im-
age of power tends to be personified and associated with specific political 
leaders, their personal image and level of popularity. 
Although the image of power kept changing throughout the early So-
viet history (1917–1930s), it also retained certain features which allow us 
to characterize it as an image of Soviet power. The variations of this image, 
however, are quite different in their structure and in the tasks they sought 
to address. We can identify three successive images of Soviet state power 
that corresponded to the periods of the early Soviet society: revolutionary; 
workers and peasants’ (people’s power); and Party-state. Each of these im-
ages reflected changes in the ideological and political agenda (see Table 1). 
In the revolutionary image of Soviet power, symbols of the 1917 Revolu-
tion prevailed: for example, the red flag, revolutionary songs, and the sick-
le and the hammer. The Bolsheviks adjusted these symbols for the Soviet 
model, which shows that there was a connection between the bourgeois-
democratic and proletarian stages of the Revolution that the Bolsheviks 
spoke so much about. 
Under the Soviet regime, the red flag became a state symbol, thus, not only 
reflecting such meanings of the February Revolution as freedom and sacrifice 
but also the idea of relentless struggle against the past and its representatives 
for the sake of the bright Communist future. Thus, the practices of the Soviet 
government were to some extent similar to those of the Provisional Govern-
ment, which, after the old state coat of arms had been abolished, immediately 
sought to replace it with a new one. The sickle and hammer emblem was 
used on the flag of one of the Russian army regiments as early as in the spring 
of 1917. D.O. Khelaev, a Socialist-Revolutionary, suggested the image of the 
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Table 1. Continued
green globe crowned with a laurel wreath against the red flag as an emblem 
for the new Russia. Each leaf on the laurel would have symbolized one of the 
“allied republics”. It can be concluded that Khelaev anticipated what the na-
tional coat of arms of the USSR would eventually look like4.
Early Soviet history was characterized not only by “re-coding” of Feb-
ruary symbols but also the search for new ones. The choice of symbols 
was aimed at highlighting the contrast between the new regime and the 
monarchical past and the Provisional Government. La Marseillaise was re-
placed with the International; the tricoloured flag – with the red flag; the 
double-headed eagle – with the sickle and hammer. As for the state insti-
tutions, the Soviets and the Red Army embodied the new regime. 
At the revolutionary stage, power was not personified: the political dis-
course of that period used only the notion of the “leaders”. Letters from 
workers and peasants to the new government demonstrate that they did 
not associate power with specific figures. The cult of Vladimir Lenin as the 
leader of the Revolution and Soviet state had emerged only by 19225. 
4 For more detail, see: B.I. Kolonitsky, Simvoly vlasti i borba za vlast: k izucheniyu po-
liticheskoy kultury Rossiyskoy revolutsii 1917 g., “Kulturologia” 2002, 4 (24), pp. 98–114. 
5 N.V. Shalaeva, Personifikatsia obraza vlasti v sovetskoy politicheskoy kulture 1920kh 
gg, “Vlast” 2014, 2, pp. 179–183.
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Working people as the symbol of the new state were represented by 
three key figures: a worker, a peasant, and a Red Army soldier as the revo-
lutionary classes whose interests the new regime served. The Red Army 
soldier was supposed to protect the achievements of workers and peas-
ants and, being a part of the symbolism surrounding the image of power, 
this figure acquired archetypical meanings6. Representatives of other so-
cial groups were associated with the past and were considered “hostile”. 
In general, the mythology of the new power was still evolving and in all 
likelihood was connected with the utopia – the idea of the future as the 
ultimate goal worth dying for. 
Revolutionary songs played an important role in the propaganda of 
Soviet state power. Their mobilizing energy was brought to light by the 
events of 1917, when songs became an instrument of unity, identifica-
tion, self-organization, and demonstration of social sentiments and social 
needs. La Marseillaise was an unofficial anthem of the 1917 Revolution 
as the Provisional Government claimed the heritage of the Great French 
Revolution. La Marseillaise was later replaced by the International, which, 
along with other revolutionary songs, established the traditions of the So-
viet song culture. 
Days of Freedom and Remembrance Day for Victims of the Revolu-
tion were celebrated since 1917. At the same time, the accompanying 
rituals appeared. Later, these rituals and celebrations were successfully 
adopted by the Soviet government. The Soviet model of revolutionary 
holidays prioritized such practices as mass meetings, parades, pageants, 
and theatrical performances, thus, combining the Russian military tradi-
tions, Orthodox church rituals, and traditions of the revolutionary un-
derground (Fig. 2). 
New sites of memory started to emerge during the 1917 Revolution, 
in particular, burial sites of revolutionary heroes. This practice was sup-
ported by the Soviet government: on 12 April 1918, a decree was adopted 
proposing to demolish the “ugliest” sculptures and replacing them with 
new ones; to decorate streets for celebrations with revolutionary symbols 
such as flags and banners; and to rename streets, replace signs and em-
blems with new ones that would reflect the ideas and sentiments of the 
revolutionary Russia7. 
6 V. Bonnel, Representatsia zhenschiny v rannikh sovetskikh plakatakh, in: Vizualnaya an-
tropologia: rezhimy vidimosty pri sotsialisme, E.R. Yarskaya-Smirnova, P.V. Romanova (eds.), 
Moskva: OOO ‘Variant’, Centre for Social Policy and Gender Studies, 2009, p. 247. 
7 Dekret o pamyatnikakh respubliki ot 12 aprelya 1918 g., in: Dekrety sovetskoy vlasti, vol. 15, 
vol. 2, 17 marta–10 ijulja, Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 
1959, pp. 95–97.
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At the early stage of its development, the Soviet ritual culture involved 
not only creation of the new mass festive culture and sites of memory but 
also new state ceremonies. One of the first rituals approved by the govern-
ment was the Oath of Allegiance for Red Army soldiers, which started 
with the words: “I, a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
joining the ranks of the Workers and Peasants’ Red Army, do hereby take 
the oath of allegiance [...]”8.
Another distinctive feature of the revolutionary image of power was 
the usage of new types of documents, including decrees of the Soviet go-
vernment which formalized Soviet legislative practices throughout the re-
volutionary period and further on. Along with the legislative functions, 
decrees also served as communication media, as means of agitation and 
propaganda. Decrees formed a new legislative environment, state system, 
and social structure. Those decrees that described rules and regulations 
for execution of official documents are particularly interesting since they 
8 Formula torzhestvennogo obeschania voinov Raboche-Krestyanskoy Krasnoy armii, in: 
Dekrety sovetskoy vlasti, p. 156.
Fig. 2. Poster from the series ABC of the Revolution, Adolf Strakhov, 1921
203iMages oF Power in the earLy soviet society...
were perceived as an instrument of power and laid the foundation for 
the new bureaucratic system9. One of the most significant documents was 
the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, adopted 
by the Third All-Russia Congress of the Soviets in January 1918 and later 
included into the first Soviet Constitution, adopted by the Fifth All-Russia 
Congress of the Soviets on 10 July 1918 (see Fig. 3)10.
By and large, at the revolutionary stage, the image of Soviet power, tho-
ugh incomplete and somewhat chaotic, was emotionally intense and based 
on the rigid dichotomy between friends and foes. This dichotomy symboli-
zed the society split into two hostile camps: those defending the righteous 
cause of the Revolution and their enemies – the “good” and the “evil”.
Workers and peasants’ (people’s) image of Soviet power evolved in the 
period between 1923 and 1929 in the conditions of NEP (New Economic 
9 Postanovlenie o forme blankov gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdeny ot 2 marta 1918 goda, in: 
Dekrety sovetskoy vlasti, vol. 15, vol. 2, 25 oktyabrya 1917–16 marta 1918 g., Moskva: Gos-
udarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoy literatury, 1957, pp. 514–515. 
10 Konstitutsia (Osnovnoy Zakon) Rossiyskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Federativnoy Sovetskoy Re-
spubliki, Prinyata V Vserossiyskim syezdom Sovetov v zasedanii ot 10 ijulja 1918 goda, 
http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/cnst1918.htm#1 [access: 6 II 2018].
Fig. 3. The cover of the RSFSR Constitution of 1918
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Policy) and post-war reconstruction, and reflected the changing priori-
ties of the Soviet government. When the Civil War was over, displays 
of power became less aggressive. Symbols of peaceful labour, interna-
tional brotherhood, and expectations of the World Revolution started 
to prevail. 
Power was now personified by Vladimir Lenin: by 1924, the iconogra-
phy of Lenin as the chief leader (vozhd) with the accompanying mytholo-
gemes had been firmly established in the mass consciousness. Depending 
on the situation, the following variants of Lenin’s iconography were used: 
Lenin as the leader of the world proletariat; the leader of the Bolshevik 
Party; a fervent revolutionary; a hero struggling for the liberation of the 
working class; a statesman; a man of genius; and “the most humane of all 
the humans”. 
The 1924 Constitution renewed the symbols of state power (flag and 
coat of arms), which reflected the vastness of the USSR state. These symbols 
included all the previous signs (sickle, hammer, star) but in a new colour 
scheme, in which the red and golden colours prevailed. The Soviets conti-
nued to exist as the symbol of statehood but they were no longer a class-
based institution representing interests of the exploited people. Instead, 
they became an organ of people’s power. The concept of “the people” was 
also expanded and acquired new meanings: the notion of classes was now 
augmented with the idea of diversity and unity, that is, the people were 
now presented as a unified multi-national community and masters of the 
country despite their social diversity and inequality (see Fig. 4). 
In the second half of the 1920s, the revolutionary myth had already 
taken shape, with cinematography playing a pivotal role in this process. 
The trilogy of Sergey Eisenstein (Strike, 1924; Battleship “Potemkin”, 1925; 
October, 1927) merits special attention in this respect as it created the im-
age of the Revolution as a violent and uncontrollable civil riot but, even 
more importantly, turned the Revolution into a legend. 
In the 1920s, the cult of the Revolution became a state cult and had a di-
rect impact on the development of Soviet political culture and Soviet my-
thology. The Revolution was seen not only as the central event of the twen-
tieth century but also as a universal concept, as a way for solving all kinds 
of problems – economic, social, political, technical, and moral. The word 
“revolution” was widely used in everyday speech. Moreover, it was used 
in construction of “revolutionary” names and toponyms, being second in 
popularity only to the name of Lenin. The concept of “revolution” also 
included religious meanings as it was associated with such concepts as 
“faith”, “miracle” and “bright future”. According to Kolonistky, belief in 
miracles was one of the key elements of mass political consciousness in the 
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Fig. 4. Poster Victory of the Revolution lies in the cooperation of workers and peasants, M.M. 
Cheremnykh, 1925
revolutionary period11, since people at large retained the religious world-
view. Religious meanings were thus re-coded into revolutionary symbols. 
In the 1920s, the system of revolutionary holidays and celebrations gra-
dually crystallized and took the place of religious ones. It should be noted 
that these festivities usually included mass theatrical performances, mili-
tary and sports parades and mass meetings. The range of state ceremonies 
was enlarged through the inclusion of such events as elections of Soviet 
deputies, farewell ceremonies for recruits to the Red Army. These were 
seen not as a private occasion for people to exercise their civil rights but as 
a public duty. State holidays – Abolition of Monarchy, Commemoration 
of the Paris Commune, Anniversary of October Revolution, Anniversary 
of Lenin’s Death, Day of the International – demonstrated people’s loyalty 
to the government and the government’s commitment to the interests of 
the people. Practices associated with the Party, Komsomol and the Pio-
neer Organization were ritualized, especially those related to the youth 
initiation and served to emphasize young people’s role in the struggle for 
Communism. 
11 B.I. Kolonistky, Navstrechu Oktyabryu, Krasnaya Paskha revolutsii, Nash Petrograd – 
Chetverty Rim, “Delo”, weekly newspaper, 23 IV 2007, http://www.idelo.ru/461/19.html 
[access: 6 II 2018].
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The workers and peasants’ (people’s) image of Soviet power created in 
the 1920s signified a transition from the revolutionary image associated 
with the spontaneous protest and utopian ideas about the future to the 
image of powerful state, whose might relied on the “unity” of the people 
and the Communist Party and the “wisdom” of its leader. Ideas about 
people being the “masters” of their country receded into the past together 
with the NEP policy and the horizontal power model was replaced by the 
vertical hierarchy, which found reflection in the new symbols of power. 
Party-state iMage oF Power. 1930s 
In the 1930s, displays of power were shaped by the cult of personality 
and, therefore, became explicitly personified: the cult of the dead leader 
was used to legitimize the cult of the living leader Joseph Stalin as “a loyal 
Party comrade”, “true Communist” and “father of the peoples”. This cult 
absorbed other symbols of power, including Soviet institutions, pushing 
to the foreground the idea of the Party as an intermediary responsible for 
delivering Lenin’s ideas to the people and the leader as the messiah. 
In the Stalinist epoch, the image of power was filled with signs of 
strength/might (machines, factories, power stations, tractors, planes, and 
so on); prosperity and happiness (bread, children, flowers), which were 
visualized by means of propaganda. Posters, films, sports and military 
parades, and theatrical performances created a festive and triumphant fa-
cade of Soviet reality, hiding the real problems the country was facing. 
While in the 1920s Constructivist architecture flourished, in the 1930s 
it was partially replaced by the new, “wedding-cake” neo-classical style. 
In large cities, especially Moscow, palaces of culture and science, libraries, 
and museums were built. Recreation parks were laid out, decorated with 
alabaster sculptures of the youth, sportsmen, factory and kolkhoz workers, 
and marble sculptures of the leaders. Small towns and villages preserved 
their authentic look but were decorated with flags, banners, and posters. 
This space of Soviet style incorporated not only towns and villages but 
also invaded into the private space of individual people (their homes and 
domestic life), thus, forming one integral memory site, where all material 
objects and their designations (toponyms and language markers), people 
and relationships were embedded into the ideal picture of the future that 
had already come (present future) (Fig. 5). 
In the new structure of the image, people are presented as united, not 
divided into opposing classes. This concept is based on the “tri-unity” of 
the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and intelligentsia, that is, the unity 
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is seen not only as class-related but also social and professional. The price 
that had to be paid for this unity was the constant struggle with the secret 
internal enemy and the fear that the Soviet state might be destroyed from 
the inside, which strengthened the repressive regime. 
A specific symbol of that time was the 1936 Constitution, which dec-
lared socialist building and also lifted the restrictions on civil rights. The 
Constitution, which was adopted in the years of mass persecution, served 
as a cover-up for the totalitarian regime while constructing in the mass 
consciousness a parallel reality of the long-cherished dream coming true. 
In the 1930s, the creation of Soviet mythology, explaining the past, 
present and future of the country, was almost complete. The full mytho-
logical cycle comprised the revolutionary (myth of creation), cosmogo-
nic (myth about the historical inevitability of Communism), heroic and 
messianic myth, canonizing the trinity of leaders as the key figures in the 
historical process (Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Joseph Stalin) and the 
heroes of the revolution who sacrificed their lives to the revolutionary 
Fig. 5. Poster Sports parade vividly demonstrates the power and invincibility of the Soviet 
people, G. Kibaldin, 1938 
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struggle (Vasily Chapaev, Nikolai Schors, Grigory Kotovsky and others). 
The cycle also included the myth of the golden age (society of the future). 
As for the eschatological concepts in the structure of the Soviet myth, 
they were mostly associated with the bourgeois world and the pre-revo-
lutionary past12. 
To state revolutionary holidays there were added family (New Year, 
Mother’s Day) and professional holidays (Red Army Day, Militia Day, 
and so on). Thus, a renewed holiday calendar was synchronized with na-
tural cycles13. 
As a result, by the late 1930s, the construction of the image of power 
was complete and was used as an instrument of internal (Soviet society) 
and external (other states) manipulation. Basic symbolic elements of po-
wer representation introduced by the February Revolution evolved into 
Party-state imagery in which the Revolution was replaced by an image of 
a strong state, the embodiment of revolutionary dreams and hopes. This 
image persisted through the generations and still evokes nostalgic remini-
scences of the Soviet past. 
Posters oF the earLy soviet Period as a soUrce and MechanisM  
oF ForMation oF the iMage oF Power
A special role in meeting the goals of social engineering was played 
by verbalization and visualization of the image of power, which induced 
emotional reactions and, thus, resonated with the public on the emotio-
nal and even subconscious level. The combination of visualization and 
verbalization is characteristic of media forms of mass art with the poster 
and “motion pictures”, that is, cinematography, being the most effective 
in terms of impact. 
In the early Soviet society, the main channel of propaganda was the po-
ster – “street art, which was spread in millions and was meant for masses”. 
As V. Polonsky put it, the poster was able to bring art closer to the people, 
catch their eye14. The political poster not only became an element of mun-
dane life and accompanied Soviet people in public places (in the street, at 
work, in the shop, in administrative offices), but also penetrated into their 
12 N.V. Shalaeva, Sovetsky gosudarstvenny prazdnik kak mekhanism formirovania represent-
ativnogo obraza vlasti i sotsiokulturnoy kommunikatsii, “Vlast” 2013, 1, pp. 132–136.
13 For more detail, see: L.N. Mazur, Konstruirovanie revolutsionnogo mifa v sovetskom 
khudozhestvennom kinematografe (1917–1953), “Vestnik arkhivista” 2017, 3, pp. 168–182.
14 S.N. Filimonchik, Prazdnichnaya kultura Petrozavodska v 1920–1930-e gg., “Carelica” 
2015, 1 (15), pp. 38–45, http://carelica.petrsu.ru/2015/PHILIMONCHIK.pdf [access: 6 II 2018].
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private space and transformed their daily lives through the sheer power of 
its images and words. 
In fact, this is where the potential of poster art resided – in the combi-
nation of verbal and visual techniques. The conceptual core of a poster is 
created by its visual imagery, especially the colour, form and rhythm of 
the picture. In Soviet poster art, power was represented through the red 
colour (the colour range predominantly consisted of the red, white and 
black); the geometrical forms of the star and circle (eternity); and the mar-
ching rhythm. The symbolic inventory connected with the public image 
of state power was often linked to the signs of the past (“shackles/chains 
of the past”), future (star/sun), movement (train/plane), might and power 
(tank, plane, battleship), labour (sickle/hammer/factory/tractor), people 
(worker/peasant/soldier), and enemy (burzhuy/priest/White Army soldier/
meschanin). 
Posters containing these elements evoked a strong emotional reaction, 
which was intensified through captions – short, concise, expressive, often 
rhyming. Not only did captions illustrate the visual imagery and explain 
it but they also “activated” people’s second signal system and stimulated 
the transformation of emotion into motivation. 
The Soviet poster constructed a specific worldview by establishing as-
sociations between the concepts of “good” and “evil” and certain images, 
signs and colours15. A special role in this process was played by symbolism 
of the colour red as the symbol of the Revolution and the blood sacrificed 
for Communism. A popular symbol associated with power in the early 
Soviet posters was the five-pointed star. Apart from being the symbol of 
the Red Army’s valour, it acquired a new meaning of the guiding sign and 
was linked to the image of the sun (future) that shone on the world’s pro-
letariat and showed them the way to Communism. 
The image of the guiding star, in an almost Biblical sense, is represent-
ed in the poster Nothing is getting in the way of the Red Army published in 
1919 in Kharkov. The rhyming caption goes as follows: “The Red Army 
star is shining over the world/ Free and bright/ Its light shines on all the 
peoples/ The rays of its eternal red light/ as if seen through the fog/ guide 
workers of all countries, /who, like pilgrims of old days, are on their way 
to the star”16 (Fig. 6). The poetical rhythm connecting the key words of the 
Soviet image (world, freedom, light, Red Army, star, workers) gives the 
15 V. Polonsky, Russky revolutsionny plakat, Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 
1924, p. 3.
16 N.V. Shalaeva, Sotsiokulturnye zadachi sovetskoy vlasti i politichesky plakat period Grazh-
danskoy voyny, “Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i yuridicheskie nauki, kulturologia 
i iskusstovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki” 2012, 5 (19), in 2 volumes, vol. 1, pp. 209–214.
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text a chant-like quality, aimed not only at strengthening the readers’ com-
mitment but at “establishing” them in faith. 
In the early Soviet period, the Soviet political poster represented two 
main themes: the struggle with the past and building of the new world. 
The idea of struggle was central to poster imagery, the only element that 
varied was the image of the enemy. Moreover, this struggle acquired sac-
ral meanings and was seen as the only way to reach the bright Communist 
future. The concept of struggle was closely connected to the concept of 
war and stimulated people’s willingness to make personal sacrifices and 
to be ruthless towards their enemies. Thus, the Soviet mode of mass con-
sciousness and type of behaviour were formed (“staunch communist”). 
The early Soviet propaganda posters, especially those of the Revolution, 
Civil War and NEP periods, were populated by classes rather than individu-
al characters, thus, reflecting the evolving structure of Soviet society. At the 
early stage, posters mostly depicted workers/proletarians and peasants, so-
metimes together, which illustrated the social basis of the Soviet state of the 
Fig. 6. Poster Nothing is getting in the way of the Red Army, 1919, unknown artist
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“proletariat’s dictatorship”. Together with the Red Army, these characters 
stood up for the “good cause”, invariably defeating the “evil” – burzhui, the 
White Army, imperialism, religion, and other symbols of the past. 
In the 1930s, the image of the people as the social base of the regime 
became more diverse and included not only social and class-related but 
also national and demographic (age and gender) types. The concept of 
“Soviet people” incorporated all these types. Propaganda posters of that 
time were dominated by the figure of Joseph Stalin, who had gradually 
replaced not only other leaders of the Revolution but also other symbols 
of Soviet power. The 1930s posters formed iconography of Stalin’s image 
that reflected his omnipresence and variety of statuses: as people’s leader 
showing them the right way (messiah); as the helmsman and head of the 
Party (wise leader); friend/brother/father/grand-father (person); thinker 
and prophet (man of genius). 
Posters were not only means of propaganda, but were also used for agi-
tation. The flexibility of this art made posters an indispensable instrument 
for manipulating public opinion in response to the changes in the govern-
ment’s agenda. In the years of the Revolution and Civil War, the poster 
helped the government recruit people into the Red Army and promote 
such measures as The Decree on Peace, The Decree on Land, The Decree 
on Workers’ Control, and so on. The posters also formed the image of 
the enemy in the mass consciousness. In the 1920s, the poster started to 
perform a wider range of functions: along with practical tasks of stimu-
lating economic revitalization and promotion of the new lifestyle, posters 
and films constructed the myth of the Revolution, popularizing its history, 
goals and aims among the illiterate and semi-literate population (Poster 
series ABC of the Revolution by Adolf Strakhov, 1921. See Fig. 2). More com-
plex propaganda tasks contributed to thematic and stylistic diversity of 
poster forms, which sought new artistic means to reflect the transforma-
tions of society and its transition to the future (Fig. 7). 
The 1930s poster was drastically different from the previous versions: 
it focused on the success of industrialization and collectivization, on hap-
py and prosperous life, and, in addition, the need for protection of the 
Socialist motherland from internal and external enemies. In this period, 
poster art was canonized and lost its former diversity: being subjected to 
the principles of “Socialist Realism”, it became another channel of “Soviet 
style” (see Fig. 5). Posters of that time emphasize the strength and might 
of the state by employing images of the army, aviation, and machines. 
They also depict industrialization through the images of power stations 
and factories being built. It is remarkable that in the 1930s posters, the 
colours are softer and more varied and that lighter shades, especially of 
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the white, prevail. Poster art represented the society of the future as the 
dream that had already come true. 
Thus, the information structure of the poster comprised short, catchy 
captions and visual imagery with colours and style (iconographic style 
resembling the traditional folk lubok) that appealed to the mass audience. 
By employing these means, the poster not only conveyed the new govern-
ment’s key ideas to the public but also helped create the necessary emotio-
nal effect, enhance people’s motivation and mythologize the mass conscio-
usness. Poster art established a special contact zone in which individual 
and mass consciousness merged to create the feeling of co-participation 
and to construct social identities of new classes and groups. 
concLUsion
The image of power served as the main instrument to manipulate 
mass consciousness: it was used not only to intimidate people but also to 
foster their sense of loyalty and allegiance. Moreover, the public image 
of state power helped to distinguish the Soviet regime from its antece-
dents and contemporary alternatives. In its development, the image of 
Fig. 7. Poster October Revolution is a bridge to the bright new future, 1927
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power went through the following stages: construction, reconstruction, 
and deconstruction, which both reflected the evolution of the Soviet re-
gime and met its needs. Each stage corresponded to its own official ima-
ge of power: for example, the period from 1918 to 1923 (Revolution and 
Civil War), to the revolutionary image (construction). Though incom-
plete, this image was charged with emotion and was characterized by 
the rigid dichotomy between friends and foes. This dichotomy symboli-
zed the society split into two opposing camps. This image was the most 
emotionally intense and the most influential as it was passed on to the 
following generations and was imprinted on their subconscious level. 
In Soviet history, there were at least two more periods when this ima-
ge was revived in the collective historical memory: it was the “Thaw”, 
which launched the process of de-Stalinization, and the perestroika. Both 
periods were characterized by democratization, which relied on the 
symbols of the Revolution.
The period between 1924 and 1929 (NEP) corresponded to the peasants 
and workers’ (people’s power) image of Soviet power, which was aimed at re-
storation and transformation of the society as a part of the Communist pro-
ject. Ideologically, at the core of this new image of power was still the cult of 
the Revolution, which was reconstructed to meet the new targets of Socialist 
building. These targets were considered to be the logical continuation of 
the revolutionary processes. Due to a number of objective and subjective 
reasons, this image was not developed further and at later stages was par-
tially dismantled because it did not meet the new needs of the government.
In the 1930s (Stalinist epoch), the deconstruction of the revolutionary 
image was followed by the creation of the Party-state image of power, which 
used the ideas of the Revolution but treated them as a part of the heroic 
past and a necessary step towards building the desired future – Socialist 
society as the first phase of Communist society. In the future, the only for-
ce that would guarantee that the achievements of the October Revolution 
would be preserved would be the Communist Party and its leader, Joseph 
Stalin. The Party-state image of Soviet power differed from the earlier va-
riations because it used emotionally charged symbols of strength, unity 
and ruthlessness towards the enemies. Thus, this image was targeted at 
the “children of the Revolution”, in particular young people, fostering no-
stalgia and securing public support of the regime17.
17 I.A. Esaulov, Kategoria sobornosti v russkoy literature, Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodsk 
University’s Publishing House, 1995, p. 174; S. Sheshunova, Yazyk propagandy 1918–1922 
v kontekste russkoy kultury, http://postsymbolism.ru/joomla/index.php?id=33&option=com_
content&task=view [access: 6 II 2018].
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Overall, throughout the early Soviet period, the public displays of So-
viet power conveyed four key ideas: struggle, klassovost, unity, and future. 
The only thing that changed was the emphasis shifting from one of these 
elements to another. These elements set the main trend in the evolution of 
the image of power. 
In the early Soviet period, this image was constructed primarily 
with the help of agitation and propaganda (“Agitprop”), with the key 
role played by the political poster art. It can be said that posters provi-
ded the main channel for visualization and verbalization of the image 
of power. As cinematography and television developed, the role of gra-
phic visual propaganda such as the poster was diminishing although 
the concept of a political poster never lost its significance but instead 
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